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Notes
SECTION 13(d) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT: AFTER TOUCHE ROSS
AND TRANSAMERICA, DOES AN

ISSUING CORPORATION HAVE AN
IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF?
The burden ofenforcing the disclosurerequirementsofsection 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act statutorilyfalls upon the SEC. In recentyears,however, those
persons entitled to such disclosure-issuersof securities registeredunder the ExchangeAct-have attempted to enforcesection 13(d) by means of an impliedprivate
cause of actionfor injunctive relief This Note examines the proprietyof such actions, beginningwith an analysis ofsection 13(d)'s historicalbackgroundand legislative history. The Note then examines theprecedentandpolicysupportforan implied
private action under section 13(d) and the Supreme Court's current standardfor
implying such actions. The Note asserts that although this standardwill not support
an action under section 13(d), theneedfor supplementalenforcement of the securties
laws should be recognized To this end, the Note concludes, Congressshould adopt
spec#Fc amendments to the Exchange Act that would grant an expressprivateremedy.

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 13(d) was added to the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 (Exchange Act) by the Williams Act amendments
of 1968.2 Under the provisions of section 13(d), any person
who acquires more than five percent of an equity security
registered under the Exchange Act3 is required to file a Schedule
1. Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, § 2, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), codfed at 15 U.S.C.
78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
2. The Williams Act amended the Exchange Act by adding sections 13(d) and (e)
and sections 14(d)-(f), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), codFed at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d) and (e), 78n(d)-(]) (1976). The Williams Act also amended section 12(i), 15
U.S.C. § 781(i) (1976). See notes 28-56 infra and accompanying text.
3. "Almost any arrangement that takes A's money and gives it to B to manage for
[A's] benefit may be deemed to be a security." D. VAGTs, BAsic CORPORATION LAw 832
(1979).
An "equity security" is one that represents a shareholder's interest rather than a
creditor's ....
The borderline is somewhat difficult to draw at times but factors
pointing to an equity security include entitlement to dividends (not interest), a
right to vote, an absence of a right to a return of the amount contributed at a fixed
date.
Id. at 826. Equity security is commonly represented by shares of stock. Registration under
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13DI with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC)
within ten days of the acquisition. A copy of the statement must
also be sent to the issuing corporation.5 The Schedule 13D must
disclose the purchaser's 6 identity and background, purpose in acquiring the stock, source of financing, extent of acquisition and
arrangements or contracts with other persons concerning the
stock.7
the Exchange Act involves registration of the security under section 12 of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976). Id. at 831.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. I 1979), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1-.13d-102 (1980).
5. The issuing corporation is sometimes referred to as the "target corporation" See,
eg., Hearingson S. 510 Before the Subeommn on Securitiesof the Senate Comn on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 247, 249 (1967) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. For the
purposes of this Note, however, "issuing corporation" will be used to avoid confusion with
legislation specifically directed at tender offers. For a discussion of this distinction, see note
33 infra.
6. A person may also acquire stock by inheritance or gift. See note 41 infra and
accompanying text. For the purposes of this Note, however, the acquirer will be referred to
as the purchaser.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) provides:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this
title, or any equity security of an insurance company which would have been
required to be so registered except for the exemption contained in section
781(g)(2)(G) of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall,
within ten days after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security at its
principal executive office, by registered or certified mail, sent to each exchange
where the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement containing
such of the following information, and such additional information, as the Commission may by rules and regulations, prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors(A) the background, and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the nature of such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons by whom
or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected,
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be
used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price is represented
or is to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise
obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such security, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties thereto, except that where a
source of funds is a loan made in the ordinary course of business by a bank, as
defined in section 78c(a)(6) of this title, if the person filing such statement so requests, the name of the bank shall not be made available to the public,
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which
such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with
any other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate
structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and
the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or
indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving
the background, identity, residence, and citizenship of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts
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A purchaser who has acquired the requisite amount of stock
and either fails to fie a Schedule 13DI or files a false or misleading statement9 becomes subject to express statutory sanctions.
One such sanction, imposed on a purchaser for filing a false or
misleading statement, makes that individual liable under section
18(a) of the Exchange Act to any person "who, in reliance upon
such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price
which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such
reliance.
...10 Moreover, if no statement is ified, the SEC may
seek to compel the filing of a truthful Schedule 13D by bringing a
suit for injunctive relief under the authority of section 21 of the
Exchange Act."l
If the issuing corporation or its shareholders fail to satisfy either the purchaser/seller or reliance requirements of section
18(a),12 or if the SEC fails to seek enforcement under section 21,'1
the purchaser's violation of section 13(d) will not be remedied. To
alleviate this problem, the federal courts have implied a private
cause of action for injunctive relief under section 13(d) for both
or calls, guaranties of profits, division of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, arrangements,
or understandings have been entered into, and giving the details thereof.
8. See notes 69-75 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 81-131 infra and accompanying text.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Section 18(a) does not create liability for failure to file.
See notes 198, 201 infra and accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976). See notes 282-84 infra and accompanying text.
12. The express damage remedy under section 18(a) is rarely litigated because of its
"double-barreled" causation requirement. 3 L. Loss, SEcuRiTiES REGULATION 1752 (2d
ed. 1961).
Not only must the Section 18(a) plaintiff demonstrate that he bought or sold the
security and that the statement or omission sued upon was false or misleading, he
must also shoulder the heavier burden of proving (1) that his damages resulted
from reliance on the false or misleading information, and (2) that the purchase or
sale price was affected by that information.
Report ofthe Advisory Comm. on Corporate Disclosureto the Securities andExchange Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 678 (1977). See Stromfeld v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In Stromfeld a shareholders suit for damages
under section 13(d) was dismissed, because the shareholder failed to meet the section 18(a)
causation requirements. The court noted that "[slection 18 requires that a plaintiff establish knowledge of and reliance upon the alleged misstatements contained in any document
filed with the S.E.C." Id. at 1268. Accord, W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith,
Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800 (D. Neb. 1979); Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976). Because
of the difficult burden of proving causation under section 18(a), one writer contends that an
implied cause of action for damages should exist under section 13(d) without a showing of
actual reliance and causation. See Comment, Private Rights ofActionfor Damages Under
Section 13(d), 32 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1980).
13. See notes 296-323 infra and accompanying text.
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the issuing corporation and its shareholders. 4 Of these potential
plaintiffs, the issuer is generally in a better position than its shareand
holders to enforce section 13(d) because it has the resources
'5
action."'
injunctive
an
maintaining
to
"vital
self-interest
Until recently, no federal court had denied an issuing corporation the right to assert an implied cause of action for injunctive
relief under section 13(d). In 1980, however, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois dismissed an issuing corporation's
injunctive action in Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent A
Car,'6 Gateway held that "section 13(d) cannot be fairly read to
imply a private right of action for injunctive relief on behalf of
issuing corporations such as Gateway."' 7 The district court's decision was based on two recent Supreme Court cases-Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redingtont8 and TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, Inc. v.
Lewis' 9-- which denied the implication of private damage remedies under the federal securities laws.20
The Gateway decision was rejected by the District Court for
the Western District of Michigan in Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin
Industries,Inc.2 1 and was later cited with approval by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Sta-Rite Industries,
Inc. v. Nortek, Inc.22 This conflict among the district courts calls
into question the propriety of granting to an issuing corporation
an implied private cause of action for injunctive relief under section 13(d).
In analyzing the issue of whether an issuing corporation may
enforce section 13(d) disclosures through an implied cause of action for injunctive relief, this Note first discusses the historical
background of section 13(d). 3 The Note then analyzes the
Supreme Court's standard for implying private causes of action
from federal regulatory statutes.24 In addition, the Note applies
14.
15.
(1972).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
text.
22.
text.
23.
24.

See notes 81-99 infra and accompanying text.
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,719 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,406 U.S. 910
See notes 81-90 infra and accompanying text.
495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. IlM.1980). See notes 100-18 infra and accompanying text.
495 F. Supp. at 99.
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
444 U.S. 11 (1979).
See notes 173-235 infra and accompanying text.
495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980). See notes 119-26 infra and accompanying
494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980). See notes 127-31 infra and accompanying
See notes 28-136 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 137-235 infia and accompanying text.
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that standard to section 13(d) 25 and discusses the policy considera-

tions involved in granting or denying an issuing corporation injunctive relief under section 13(d). 26
Touche Ross and Transamerica have raised doubts about the

enforceability of the Williams Act. The SEC, therefore, has proposed an amendment to the Exchange Act which would expressly

provide for private causes of action. This Note outlines and
briefly discusses that proposal. 27 The Note concludes that, because of the present Court's strict standard for implication and
because the Court has rejected arguments in favor of supplemental enforcement, Congress must grant to issuing corporations an

express private cause of action for injunctive relief under section
13(d).
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Williams Act
An axiom of American securities regulation holds that "[t]he

keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities legislation is
disclosure. ' 2 Yet, in the early 1960's, it became apparent that an
important part of American business strategy-the corporate takeover attempt-was not subject to the far-reaching disclosure requirements of the securities laws. 9 Prior to that time, the absence

of disclosure was not a problem because "corporate takeover attempts had typically involved either proxy solicitations, regulated
under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act,t301 . . . or exchange
offers of securities, subject to the registration requirements of the
1933 Act t3 t1 ...
-32 However, the securities laws substantially

failed to regulate corporate takeovers by the means of cash tender
offers or, more important to this inquiry, the open market acquisition of an issuing corporation's stock.3 3
25. See notes 236-95 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 296-339 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 340-50 infra and accompanying text.
28. Report ofSpecial Study ofSecurities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 1 (1963).
29. 113 CONG. REC. 854, 24,664 (1967).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976). "A proxy is a power given by a shareholder to another
person to vote his (or her) share(s) of stock." D. VAGTS, supra note 3, at 830.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
32. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977). See notes 164-71 infra and
accompanying text.
33. S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967). A former Chairman of the Commission explained such transactions, stating:
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In 1965, Senator Harrison Williams introduced a bill designed
to close this regulatory gap.34 He maintained that some form of
disclosure of these unregulated takeover attempts was "the only
way that corporations, their stockholders, and employees" could
adequately prepare "in advance to meet the threat of the takeover
specialist." 3 5 His original bill, S. 2731,36 required that "any substantial accumulation of shares. . must be preceded by the filing
S. 2731 was designed to protect
of public information . . . ."
incumbent management from "industrial sabotage" resulting from
reckless corporate raids on "proud old companies. '3
S. 2731 was later revised on the recommendation of the SEC.3 9
At that time, the SEC foreshadowed the present section 13(d) by
proposing that disclosure be made within five days after the acquisition.' This allowance for after-the-fact disclosure was advised
because, as the SEC noted, "[W]e envision some types of situations in which compliance with an advance notice requirement
would be impossible, such as acquisition by inheritance or by gift
A tender offer is quite different from the ordinary market transaction with
which the average investor is familiar. In so far as it is an offer at all it is subject
to complex and sometimes deceptive conditions. Rather it is an invitation to the
public security holder who "tenders" his security to give the other party an option--to be exercised only if certain minimum shares are tendered within a specified time and perhaps specifying a maximum which the original "offeror" is
prepared to take-but giving him discretion to accept a lesser or larger amount or
to extend the time limits. Tendering in response to such an offer involves deposit
of the public security holder's shares or obtaining a guarantee from a stock exchange member or other financially responsible person that they will be deposited.
Not all acquisitions of substantial blocks of securities are made by means of
tender offers. A corporation or individual-or group of corporations or individuals--can acquire a substantial block of stock of a company through a program of
purchases in the open market, or through privately-negotiated purchases from
substantial stockholders, and thus achieve the power to influence the management
and control of the corporation, without the other stockholders even becoming
aware of this development.
HearingsBefore the Subcomra on Commerce and Financeofthe House Comm on Interstate
andForeignCommerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 14 (1968) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen).
34. 111 CONG. REC. 28,259 (1965).
35. Id. Senator Williams remarked: "In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after white-collar pirates have seized control with funds
from sources which are unknown in many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets,
later to split up most of the loot among themselves." Id. at 28,257.
36. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
37. Id. at 28,259.
38. Id. at 28,257-58.
39. 112 CONG. REc. 19,003 (1966).
40. Id. at 19,004, 19,006. As enacted, section 13(d) requires disclosure within ten days
after the acquisition. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) (set forth in full in note 7
supra).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:532

of which the recipient had no advance notice."'" Moreover, Senator Williams remarked that "disclosure after the transaction
avoids upsetting the free and open auction market where buyer
and seller normally do not disclose the extent of their interest and
avoids prematurely disclosing the terms of privately negotiated
transactions."42
S. 2731 was not enacted, but was later reintroduced in 1967 as
S. 510.4 3 Hearings were held on S.5104 and Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman of the SEC, urged passage with extensive testimony
and statements. There were, however, critics of S. 51041 who asserted that requiring disclosure of cash tender offers and open
market acquisitions would give incumbent management the upper
hand in the battle for corporate control.46 This outcome was
thought to be undesirable because it might serve to reinforce complacent management at the expense of healthy change.4 7
In response, the proponents of S. 510 stressed that the bill
could be drafted to avoid giving incumbent management an undesirable advantage in the battle for control. 4 The House Report
emphasized that, in its final form, the Williams Act:
avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. It
is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
investors while at the same time providing the offeror and man41. Id. at 19,004.
42. 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967).
43. 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The bill was co-sponsored by Senator Thomas
Kuchel. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967). S. 50 had the full support ofthe SEC, the New York
Stock Exchange, and the American Stock Exchange. Id. at 24,665.
44. Senate Hearings, supra note 5; Hearings on H.? 14475, S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce andFinanceof the House Comm. on InterstateandForeign Commerce,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter House Hearings].
45. House Hearings, supra note 44, at 64 (statement of Jordan H. Eskin). See also
Senate Hearings,supra note 5, at 136-39 (statement of Professor Robert H. Mundheim); id.
at 128-29 (statement of Arthur Fleischer); Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisitionby
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967).

46. See generaly Manne, Cash Tender Offersfor Sharer-A Repiy to ChairmanCohen,
1967 DuKE L. 231 (in reply to Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and CorporatePurchases
of Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966)).
47. W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SEcuRrrIEs CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

387-88 (1979).
48. 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967). S.510 sought to parallel the neutrality of the existing
proxy regulations. Id. at 24,664. Neutrality is achieved in the Williams Act and the proxy
regulations by a grant of control to the SEC over the regulated conduct. In a proxy contest
this control is characterized by concerted attempts to avoid interfering with the strategy of

the participants. See Hearings on S.879 Beore the Subcomin on Securities of the Senate
Comm on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1695, 1696 (1956) (remarks of former SEC Chairman Armstrong).
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49
agement equal opportunity to fairly present their case.

After being unanimously recommended by the congressional
committees, S. 510 was enacted as an amendment to the Exchange
Act on July 29, 1968.50
Section 13(d) was one of S. 510's principal disclosure provisions.51 This section, along with its implementing rules, 52 was intended to make public every stock acquisition which could affect

the control of a corporation. 3 Section 13(d) disclosure made "the
relevant facts known so that shareholders would have a fair opportunity to make [investment] decisions."5 4 Information concerning the purchaser's plans in acquiring the stock "if known to
investors, might substantially change the assumptions on which
the market price [of the issuing corporation's stock] is based."5 5

"Thus, the objective of Section 13(d) was to provide to shareholders and the marketplace relevant information and a fair opportunity to evaluate the securities of a company in response to
with the potential to affect or change control of the
acquisitions
' 56
company.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813. See also S.REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

50. As originally enacted, the section 13(d) disclosure requirements were not triggered
until a purchaser had acquired more than 10% of an issuer's stock. In 1970 the amount of
stock required for disclosure was lowered from 10% to 5%. Section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act, as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970), codpied at 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 11979). It appears that the amount was lowered to increase the
number of purchasers who would file. In some corporations if a purchaser acquired 10%
he or she would also acquire control. If the purchaser had to report at 5%, the investor in
the marketplace would have been warned before actual control at 10% occurred. S. REP.
No. 1125, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). See also Hearingsto Ascertain the Views of Hamer
H. Budge, Chairmanof the Securitiesand Exchange Commission, on Problemsin the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm on Securitiesof the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969).
51. See Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosureof CorporateEquity Ownershio, 119 U.
PA. L. REv. 853 (1971).
52. Schedule 13D and its accompanying rules may be found at 17 C.F.R.
240.13d-l-.13d-102 (1980).
53. Securities and Exchange Commission Report on Tender Offer Laws to the Senate
Comm on Banking,Housing,and UrbanAffairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1980) [hereinafter
Commission Report].
54. S. REP. No. 550,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) (noted in Commission Report, supra
note 53, at 49).
55. Id.
56. Commission Report, supra note 53, at 49.
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Case Law

Unlike other sections of the securities laws,5" section 13(d)
does not expressly provide for private causes of action. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances a
private cause of action may be implied from elements of the fed-

eral securities laws, even though the specific provisions are silent
as to private remedies.5 8 The Court has reasoned that if the con-

gressional purpose in enacting the statute would be undermined
without private enforcement, a private cause of action could be
implied in favor of those who were intended to be protected by the
statute.5 9
JI Case Co. v. Borak6 ° is the seminal case for the Court's recognition of implied private remedies under the federal securities

laws. In Borak, a shareholder of the J.I. Case Company alleged
that the merger of Case and American Tractor Corporation was

affected by the circulation of false and misleading proxy statements in violation of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.6 ' The
trial court held that it had no power to redress the alleged violations under section 14(a) and that under section 27 of the Exchange Act, it could grant only declaratory relief.62 The Court of
57. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1976);
Exchange Act, §§ 9, 16, 18, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p, 78r, 78t (1976).
58. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (referring to J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 60-68 infra).
59. Id. at 25. The concept of implication "developed in the context of the tort law
....
"The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 281 (1977) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286(a) (1938), which provides:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to
do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another
if. . . the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of
the other as an individual ....
.
60. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
61. Id. at 427. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-

mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any

proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an ex-

empted security) registered on any national securities exchange pursuant to section 78! of this title.
The relevant SEC prescription was rule 14a-9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980).
62. 377 U.S. at 427-28. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) provides in part:
The district courts of the United States, the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that federal
courts are empowered to grant remedial relief under section
14(a). 63 In an opinion by Justice Clark, the Supreme Court found
that shareholders possessed an implied cause of action as to both
derivative and direct causes of action for losses resulting from deceptive proxy solicitations in violation of section 14(a). 64
Justice Clark reasoned that, although section 14(a) makes no
reference to private causes of action, "among its chief purposes is
'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result."65 Justice Clark viewed the threat of civil damages or private injunctive
relief as a "necessary supplement to Commission action,"66 serving as an "effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements." 67 He concluded that, although "federal courts have
the power to grant all necessary remedial relief. . . [wlhatever
68
remedy is necessary must await the trial on the merits."
While Borak involved private remedial relief under section
14(a), the Court in Rondeau v. Mosinee PaperCorp.69 also considered the merits of a petition by an issuing corporation for injunctive relief under section 13(d). In Rondeau, the issuing
corporation, Mosinee Paper, brought suit to enjoin the purchaser
from voting his stock and from acquiring additional stock and to
compel him to divest himself of stock already purchased. 70 The
purchaser, Rondeau, had failed to file a Schedule 13D because of
his unfamiliarity with the securities laws. 7 ' When Rondeau
learned of his obligation, he fied a truthful Schedule 13D. The
trial court granted summary judgment to Rondeau, since Mosinee
Paper could not prove that it suffered the irreparable harm necesrules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the
district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any
suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and
regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant
is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may
be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever
the defendant may be found.
63. Borak v. J.L Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 1963).
64. 377 U.S. at 431.
65. Id. at 432.
66. Id See notes 296-323 infra and accompanying text.
67. 377 U.S. at 432.
68. Id. at 435.
69. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
70. Id. at 55.
71. Id. at 53.
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sary to sustain injunctive relief.7 2 The Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit reversed and held that irreparable harm did not
need to be shown for Mosinee Paper to obtain injunctive relief for
Rondeau's violation of section 13(d).73

The narrow issue addressed on certiorari was whether the

"record supports the grant of injunctive relief .

. . ."I

In an

opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court answered this question
in the negative and reversed the Seventh Circuit by holding that
private litigants must show "irreparable harm" before they can
75
obtain injunctive relief in a suit under section 13(d).
Because of the decision on this issue, the more fundamental
question-whether the corporation was entitled to bring the action
in the first instance-was not resolved. The Court, however, recognized the issue:
Although neither the availability of a private suit under the
Williams Act nor respondent's standing to bring it has been
questioned here, this cause of action is not expressly authorized
by the statute or its legislative history. Rather, respondent is
asserting a so-called implied
private right of action established
6
by cases such as Borak.7
The Court's citation of Borak may indicate that the Court had
considered and accepted the issuing corporation's standing under
section 13(d) to assert an implied injunctive action, though it did
not expressly so rule.7 7 Moreover, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the case "involve[d] only the availability of injunctive
relief to remedy a § 13(d) violationfollowing compliance. '78 He
cautioned that the case was not a decision on "whether or under
what circumstances a corporation could obtain a decree enjoining
a shareholder who is currently in violation of § 13(d) from acquiring further shares, exercising voting rights, or launching a take'79
over bid, pending compliance with the reporting requirements.
As another court has noted, these two comments "add up to a
suggestion that the issuing corporation has a right to injunctive
72. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686, 693 (W.D. Wis. 1973). See
generally Kimberly Knitwear, Inc. v. Kimberley Stores, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1339, 1342
(W.D. Mich. 1971).
73. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 500 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 1974).
74. 422 U.S. at 57.
75. Id. at 61.

76. Id. at 62.
77. See Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1223 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981), discussed in text accompanying notes 91-99 ifa.
78. 422 U.S. at 59 n.9 (emphasis added).
79. Id. (emphasis added).

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(d)

relief prior to compliance.
... o
Although Rondeau did not expressly hold that a private cause
of action exists under section 13(d), the courts of appeals which
have confronted the issue have held that an issuing corporation
does have standing to sue for an injunction under section 13(d).
The first court to so hold was the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in GAF Corp. v. Milstein.' Milstein expressly held that an
to remissuer does have standing to seek implied injunctive relief
82
edy a purchaser's false or misleading Schedule 13D.
In its complaint, GAF alleged that the purchasers, the Milsteins, violated section 13(d) in two ways: by failing to file the
required Schedule 13D and later by filing a false statement. The
district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted.8 3 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed and remanded the case for a determination of Milstein's4
8
liability under section 13(d) and the nature of appropriate relief.
The appellate court noted that the Milsteins did not dispute
the existence of a private right of action under section 13(d) and
stated that "[t]he teachings of [Borak] are part of the ABC's of
securities law."8 5 Likewise, the Milsteins acquiesced to the standing of GAF as the issuer to assert the implied cause of action for
injunctive relief.8 6 In discussing this concession, the court asserted
that for practical reasons the standing of GAF was compelling:
"GAF, as the issuer, unquestionably is in the best position to enforce section 13(d)."' 7 Similarly, GAF could constantly monitor
transactions in its stock and therefore best know whether someone
had failed to file a disclosure statement.88 The court also recognized that GAF "has not only the resources, but the self-interest
so vital to maintaining an injunctive action."89 The opinion concluded "that the obligation to file truthful statements is implicit in
the obligation to file with the issuer, and afortiori,the issuer has
80. Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222 n.5 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981).
81. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
82. Although Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970) was decided before
Milstein, in Bath the target corporation's standing under section 13(d) was assumed with-

out discussion.
83. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
84. 453 F.2d at 722.
85. Id. at 719.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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standing under section 13(d) to seek relief in the event of a false
90
filing."

The most recent court of appeals decision to reaffim Milstein's
holding was Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Limited.91 Unitex, a manufacturer of textiles in Hong Kong, sought to acquire a substantial
equity position in Dan River, a large domestic textile manufacturer. After acquiring more than five percent of Dan River's
stock, Unitex failed to file the required Schedule 13D; the company subsequently sold a sufficient amount of stock to drop below
the five percent filing requirement.92 Unitex then established
Mannip, a corporate subsidiary in the British Virgin Islands, for
the sole purpose of acquiring Dan River stock.93 Unitex resumed
purchasing Dan River stock, again exceeded the five percent disclosure requirement and then transferred all of its Dan River
stock tojMannip. After the transfer, Mannip ified a Schedule 13D
stating that it had no "present intention to seek control. . .."9'
Dan River filed suit alleging that Unitex had failed to fie a
Schedule 13D and that Mannip's Schedule 13D contained misleading statements and omitted other material information. 95 After initially issuing a temporary restraining order, which was later
vacated, 96 the district court dismissed Dan River's suit on jurisdictional grounds. 97 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

reversed, citing Milstein as "conclusive on the issue both of standing and of jurisdiction.""8 The case was remanded to determine
whether Unitex had violated section 13(d). 99 Thus, all courts of

appeals which have addressed the issue have granted an issuing
corporation standing to seek injunctive relief under section 13(d).
The district courts have been less uniform. In Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car," for example, the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois announced that "section 13(d)
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 720 (emphasis supplied).
624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981).
Id. at 1218. Unitex denied that this sale was made to avoid filing a Schedule 13D.
Id. at 1219.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1223-24 (citing Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 611

F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979), which assumed, without discussion, that an issuing corporation
had standing to sue for an implied injunctive action; General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert,
556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977)).
99. 624 F.2d at 1228.
100. 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. IMI.1980).
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cannot be fairly read to imply a private right of action for injunctive relief on behalf of issuing corporations ... ." 101 The issuer
in that case, Gateway Industries, alleged that although the purchaser, Agency, had filed a timely Schedule 13D, the statement
failed to substantively comply with section 13(d). 1°2 Gateway,
therefore, sought an order requiring Agency to divest its Gateway
stock.103 Additionally, Gateway sought to enjoin Agency from acquiring more stock, from voting the Gateway stock already
purchased 4and from exercising any control over Gateway management.1
The district court based its decision on Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington105 and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis."° In Touche Ross, the- Supreme Court dismissed a private
litigant's damage action brought under section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, 10 7 concluding that no evidence of congressional intent
to create such a remedy existed.' The majority in Transamerica,
following the Touche Ross analysis for implication of private remedies, applied principles of statutory construction to determine
whether Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of
1940109 (the Advisers Act) to afford a private cause of action. 110 In
Transamericathe Court found an implied private cause of action
for equitable relief under section 215111 of the Advisers Act, 2 but
of action for damages under secdenied an implied private cause
114
tion 206113 of the same Act.
After reviewing these authorities, the district court in Gateway
concluded that they compelled analysis of one dispositive issue-whether Congress intended an issuing corporation to have
private injunctive relief under section 13(d)-and precluded refer101. Id. at 99.
102. Id. at 94. Gateway argued that the Schedule 13D was defective because "it failed
to provide adequate information about Agency; failed to disclose the source of borrowed
funds used to finance the purchase of Gateway shares; and misrepresented Agency's purpose in acquiring Gateway shares." Id.

103. Id. at 94 n.3.
104. Id.

105. 442 U.S. 560 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 173-214 infra.
106. 444 U.S. 11 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 215-31 infra.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976) (set forth in full in note 177 infra).
108. See note 105 supra.
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21, 54 Stat. 857 (1970).

110. 444 U.S. at 19-24 (1979).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) (set forth in part in note 218 infra).
112. 444 U.S. at 19.

113. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976) (set forth in full in note 218 infra).
114. 444 U.S. at 24.
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ence to the general "remedial purposes" of the Act or the "desirability of implying a private right of action."" 5 In analyzing the
statutory language and legislative history, the court determined
that the issuer was not within the class of persons especially benefited by section 13(d). 1 6 According to the court, the statutory
scheme of enforcement did not allow for an implied private injunctive action in the hands of an issuing corporation." 7 Thus,
after answering in the negative the dispositive question of congressional intent, the court held that Gateway could not maintain an
action for injunctive relief under section 13(d).118
Less than one month after the Gateway decision, the District
Court for the Western District of Michigan reached the opposite
conclusion and held in Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Industries,
Inc. 19 that an issuer did have an implied cause of action for injunctive relief under section 13(d).' 20 In Kirsch, the issuing corporation sought injunctive relief to remedy an allegedly false
Schedule 13D filed by the purchaser, Bliss & Laughlin Industries. 2 ' Citing Gateway, the purchaser contended that the issuer,
Kirsch, had no standing to sue.' 22 Yet the court rejected Gateway,
reasoning that Touche Ross and Transamerica did not apply to
23
section 13(d) actions.
The district court distinguished Touche Ross and Transamerica on the grounds that "(1) the cases involve[d] damages rather
than injunctive relief; and (2) there was no public interest requiring full and truthful disclosure."' 24 However, Touche Ross and
Transamerica cannot be distinguished so easily. Both cases held
that the implication of any private remedy from a federal statute
is a matter of statutory construction. 2 - Moreover, the informational purpose of section 13(d) is not unique in federal securities
115. 495 F. Supp. at 97.
116. Id. at 98-99.
117. Id. at 98.
118. Id. at 101.
119. 495 F. Supp. 488 (V.D. Mich. 1980).
120. Id. at 490-92. To remedy the purchaser's violation of section 13(d), the court
enjoined Bliss & Laughlin Industries from acquiring any additional stock in Kirsch for a
period of 30 days. This period of suspension, however, would not commence until Bliss &
Laughlin filed a truthful Schedule 13D and mailed a copy of its Schedule 13D to each
Kirsch shareholder of record as of the date of the violation. Id. at 502.
121. Id. at 489.
122. Id. at 490.
123. Id. at 491.
124. Id.
125. 442 U.S. at 568; 444 U.S. at 15. Indeed, the Court in Transamericaapplied the
Touche Ross statutory construction standard in determining whether section 215 of the
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law; all federal securities laws, including those construed in
Touche Ross and Transamerica, have as their fundamental purpose the disclosure of information for the benefit of the investing
public. 126
Exactly one month after Kirsch was decided, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin chose to reject Kirsch in StaRite Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc. 127 by dismissing an issuing
corporation's suit for injunctive relief under section 13(d). In so
dismissing, the court "concur[red] with the reasoning of the Gateway court and its application of the Touche [Rossj and Transamerica decisions to private causes of action under § 13(d)."' 128
The district court's opinion stressed the express damage remedy available to purchasers and sellers under section 18(a) as well
as the ability of the SEC to seek enforcement under section 21.129
The court did recognize as a "legitimate concern," the fact "that
relief may not be expeditiously obtained by going through the
SEC as opposed to quick access to the courts."'130 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that "[a]bsent any expression of congressional
intent to provide an avenue of private equitable relief. . ." it
would not "follow the precedent which implies such swift access
by private litigants to the courts under § 13(d) .. ,13
In summary, Milstein, Dan River andKirsch conclude that, absent private enforcement by the issuing corporation, section
13(d)'s disclosure purpose is thwarted. Private enforcement of the
securities laws "provides a necessary supplement to Commission
Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976), afforded implied private equitable relief. 444 U.S.

at 18-19.
126. See generally H.Rl Doc. No. 95, supra note 28, at 60-64. The Court in Touche

Ross noted, "In this case, the § 17(a) reports ...enable the Commissioner. . . [to] monitor the financial health of brokerage firms and protect customers from the risks involved in
leaving their cash and securities with broker-dealers." 442 U.S. at 570. Thus, section 17(a),

15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976), provides for the disclosure of information for the benefit of
investors. In Transamerica,the Court noted that section 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976),
"broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advisers, making it unlawful. . . to
engage in specified transactions with clients without makingrequireddisclosures." 444 U.S.

at 16 (emphasis added).
127. 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
128. Id. at 362. The district court appears to have misread Touche Ross and Transamerica as to the nature of relief denied, interpreting the cases as denying "implied private equitable enforcement rights." Id. (emphasis added). Touche Ross and Transamerica
denied implied private damage remedies, 442 U.S. at 578, 444 U.S. at 24. Whether this
misunderstanding affected the court's decision is uncertain.
129. Id. at 361-63. See notes 282-84 infra and accompanying text.

130. 494 F. Supp. at 363.
131. Id.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 31:532

action." 1 32 This conclusion is rooted in the notion espoused by
the Court in Borak that judicial relief should be available when
33
necessary to achieve the result sought by Congress.1
Gateway and Sta-Rite conclude that the line of authority flow-

ing from the 1964 decision in Borak can no longer be considered

as controlling' 34 -a conclusion derived from the holdings of
Touche Ross and Transamerica. Touche Ross, while not overruling Borak, limits the precedential authority of Borak to its facts:
To the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that
of the Court in Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases
since Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of private
causes of action, and we follow that stricter
13 5
standard today.
In Transamerica,the Court also limits Borak:
While some opinions of the Court [(such as Borak)] have
placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying
private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to
132. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
133. Id. at 432-33.
134. Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, 495 F. Supp. at 96, states that: "The
decline of Borak renders less than compelling the authority... finding an implied private
right of action existent under section 13(d)." Accord, Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc.,
494 F. Supp. at 361. Professor Loss has commented that Borak "reached the right result
not for the wrong reason but for no reason at all." 5 L. Loss, SEculurIEs REGULATION
2882 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
135. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 578. In the previous term, the Court
had described Borak as an unexplained deviation from the normal pattern ofjudicial implication:

mhe Court has been especially reluctant to imply causes of actions under statutes
that create duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the public at large.
[Citations omitted.] The Court has deviated from this pattern on occasion. See
J.. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 [1964] (implying a cause of action under a
securities provision describing "unlawful conduct"); SuperintendentofInsurancev.
Bankers Lfe & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 [1971] (implying a cause of action
under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5. . .); Machinists v. Central.Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 [1963] (implied cause of action under section of the
Railway Labor Act.. .). At least the latter two cases can be explained historically, however. In SuperintendentofInsurance, the Court explicitly acquiesced in
the 25-year-old acceptance by the lower federal courts of a Rule lOb-5 cause of
action. [Citations omitted.] In Machinists, the Court explicitly followed the lead
of various earlier cases in which it had implied causes of actions under various
sections of the Railway Labor Act ....
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 n.13 (1979). Cannon held that
section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976),
does afford a private cause of action to remedy sex discrimination in federally funded education programs. See notes 246-47 nfra and accompanying text. See generally Note, The
FederalSecuritiesActs: The Demise of The ImpliedPrivate .Rights Doctrine?, 1980 U. ILL

L.F. 627 (identifying a dual implied private rights doctrine as illustrated by a comparison
of statutes which create a distinct federal right in the plaintiff (Cannon) with federal regulatory statutes designed to benefit the public at large (Touche Ross)).
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effectuate the purposes of a given statute,. . . what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create
the private remedy asserted ... 36
Because the Borak standard for implication has been discredited, it is necessary to illuminate the current Supreme Court standard for implying private causes of action from the federal
securities laws.

II. THE

SUPREME COURT STANDARD FOR

IMPLYING CAUSES OF

A.
In J

ACTION

Borak andIts Progeny

Case Co. v. Borak,137 the Supreme Court sustained an

implied cause of action for remedial relief in favor of shareholders
for losses resulting from deceptive proxy solicitations in violation
of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.138 Borak set forth a twopart test for implication of private remedies under the federal securities laws: If the statute's "chief purpose" is to benefit the
W3 9 and if the implication of a remedy is necessary to effecplaintiff
tuate Congress' purpose in enacting the statute, then an implied
private remedy is appropriate."4
A decade later, the Supreme Court in NationalRailroadPassenger Corp. v. NationalAssociation of RailroadPassengers (Amtrak)t41 and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour 42

limited Borak by using the principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius--the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another. 4 3 In Amtrak, the National Association

of Railroad Passengers brought an action to. enjoin Amtrak's
planned cancellation of certain passenger trains, alleging that Amtrak's action would violate section 307(a) of the Rail Passenger
136. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 15-16.
137. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
138. See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
139. 377 U.S. at 432.
140. Id. at 433. See also Note, supra note 135, at 631; Comment,4n 4nalyticalFrameworkfor Implied Causes of-4ctiozz Section 17 of the SecuritiesExchange Act and Reding.
ton v. Touche Ross & Co., 59 B.U. L. REv. 157, 163 (1979).
141. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
142. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
143. 414 U.S. at 458; 421 U.S. at 418-20. Borak never considered whether the availability of SEC enforcement should trigger the use of the exclusio rule. 377 U.S. at 432.
Justice Clark wrote: "Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action." Id.
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Service Act of 1970.14 The Court reversed the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit 4 ' and held that section 307(a)
of the Act does not create a private cause of action' 46 because "the
remedies created in § 307(a) [enforcement by the Attorney General 147 ] are the exclusive means to enforce the duties and obligations imposed by the Act."' 4 8

The Barbour Court addressed the issue of whether customers
have an implied cause of action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 to compel the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation to act.' 4 9 CitingAmtrak for the exclusio rule,150 Barbour reversed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 51 and
held that the SEC has the exclusive authority to bring suit against
the Corporation under the Act.' 52
B.

Cort v. Ash

In 1975, the Supreme Court incorporated elements of Borak
and Amtrak in formulating a then-definitive four-part test for implying private remedies for violations of federal statutes. In Cort
v.Ash, 153 a stockholder of Bethlehem Steel Corporation brought a
derivative suit for injunctive relief and damages, charging that the
Bethlehem corporate directors violated a criminal statute by making unlawful presidential campaign contributions. 54 In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court first dismissed the shareholder's
claim for injunctive relief, noting that the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,155 enacted after the court of appeals' decision, constituted controlling intervening law. 156 The
Amendments allowed the Federal Election Commission to receive
citizen complaints and authorized the Attorney General to seek an
144. 414 U.S. at 454-55. Section 307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act is set forth in
45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976).
145. Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
146. 414 U.S. at 464-65.
147. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976).
148. 414 U.S. at 458.
149. 421 U.S. at 413-14.
150. Id. at 419.
151. SEC v. Guaranty Bond and Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974). Barbour was
acting as the receiver for Guaranty.
152. 421 U.S. at 424.
153. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
154. Id. at 68. The statute at issue was section 610 of the Federal Election Campaign
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976).
155. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
156. 422 U.S. 74 (1975).
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injunction. Accordingly, the Court held that these Amendments

relegated the shareholder's complaint
for injunctive relief to the
15 7
Federal Election Commission.

The shareholder's action for damages was also dismissed, but
for different reasons. The Court held: "[I]mplication of such a

federal cause of action is not suggested by the legislative context
of § 610 [of the Federal Election Campaign Act] or required to

accomplish Congress' purposes in enacting the statute."' 158 Justice

Brennan listed "several factors" which were "relevant" to the

Court's decision:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted," t 5s'9 1-that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one?' 60 1 Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintifft 16 11 And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law. . . so that it would
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?1 621
The Court denied the damage remedy after answering the first

three questions in the negative and the last question in the posi63
tive.1
The four factors which Justice Brennan indicated only as "rel-

evant" retained their vitality until the Supreme Court modified
157. Id. at 74-77.
158. Id. at 69.

159. Id. at 78 (citing Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (emphasis supplied)). Rigsby was the first case in which the Court implied a private remedy from a
federal statute. The first case to imply a private remedy under the federal securities laws
was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (private cause of
action for damages under the Exchange Act's rule 10b-5).
160. 422 U.S. at 78 (citing, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974) (Amtrak)).
161. Id. (citing, e.g., Amtrack; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412, 423 (1975); and Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964)).
162. Id. (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler,373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963); cf.Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1971); id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964)).
163. First: The "protection of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary concern."
422 U.S. at 81. Second: legislative silence would be overcome only if it were "clear that
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights .
" I.
Id. at 82. Third: "Recovery of derivative damages by the corporation.. . would not cure the influence which the
use of corporate funds ... may have had on a federal election." Id. at 84. Finally: The
plaintiff's action for the directors' breach of their fiduciary duty in a state court was held to
be an adequate remedy. Id.
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the fourth Cort factor in Piperv. Chris-CraftIndusties,Inc. 164 In
Piper, the Court weighed the merits of an implied cause of action
under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and concluded that "a
does not
tender offeror, suing in its capacity as a takeover bidder,
165
have standing to sue for damages.under § 14(e)."
In applying the four-part Cort test, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, reasoned that under the first Cort factor, the
issuing corporation's shareholders and not the tender offeror were
to be especially benefited by the Williams Act. 166 Under the
second Cort factor, he determined that it was Congress' intent to
curb the unregulated activities of tender offerors. This purpose,
therefore, negated the contention that tender offerors should be
given an implied private damage remedy. 167 Under the third Cort
factor, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that awarding damages to a
defeated tender offeror would not be consistent with the congressional purpose of protecting the issuing corporation's shareholders. 68 Indeed, that corporation's shareholders would indirectly
bear the burden of satisfying a damage award against the is69

suer. 1

In addressing the fourth Cort factor, Chief Justice Burger recognized the "pervasiveness of federal securities regulation,"' 70
which would apparently justify an implied cause of action. He
then stated, however, that since the tender offeror would probably
164. 430 U.S. 1, 40-42 (1977). See Pitt, Standing To Sue Under the WilliamsAct4fter
Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117, 171-73 (1978).
165. 430 U.S. at 42 n.28. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, as added by the Williams
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 457 (1968), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), is a
broad antifraud provision which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices,
in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any
soliciation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
For a definition of a tender offer see note 33 supra.
166. 430 U.S. at 37.
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 39.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 40. When the Williams Act was passed, only one state had laws which
governed tender offers. See VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528-.1-541 (1968); 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH)
60,201-14. Over half of the states now have tender offer laws. See Subcomm.
on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the ABA Comm. on Federal Regulation of
Securities, State Takeover Statutes and The Williams Act, reprintedin 32 Bus. LAW. 187
(1976); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes andTheir Constitutionality, 45 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1 (1976).
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be able to maintain "a cause of action under common-law princi7
ples of interference with a prospective commercial advantage,"' '
that it would be entirely appropriate to relegate the tender offeror's claim to a state court. Under this analysis, the final Cort
factor's inquiry into whether the cause of action is traditionally
relegated to state law becomes virtually irrelevant. The Pitiertest,
there is
instead, relegates the plaintiff to the state court whenever
72
thepossibility of a common-law cause of action.'
C. The Current Standard
1. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
In 1979, the Supreme Court continued its evolution of the
standard for implied private causes of action in Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington 7 In that case, Touche Ross, a firm of certified public accountants, had audited the accounts of Weis Securities, Inc.,
a brokerage firm. 17 4 After Weis became insolvent and was liquidated, 175 Redington was appointed trustee in the liquidation on
behalf of Weis' customers' 76 and filed an action against Touche
Ross for $51 million in damages. Redington alleged that Touche
Ross made an "improper audit and certification of the 1972 Weis
financial statements and preparation of answers to the Exchange
financial questionnaire [in violation of section 17(a) of the Exchange Act].'" 7 7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that section 17(a) imposed a duty of care on accountants in
171. 430 U.S. at 40-41.
172. For a discussion of the Piter Court's treatment of the fourth Cort factor, see Pitt,
note 164 supra, at 171-73.
173. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).

174. Id. at 563.
175. Id. at 564.
176. Id. at 565.

177. Id. at 565-66. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation also was seeking
$14 million in damages. Id. In 1972, the date relevant to ToucheRoss, section 17(a), as set

forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970), provided:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or dealer

who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member,
every registered securities association, and every broker or dealer registered pur-

suant to section 78o of this title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such periods,
such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records,
and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. Such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other
records shall be subject at any time or from time to time to such reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations by examiners or other representatives of the
Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Section 17 was substantially amended in 1975. The present section 17(a)(l) contains essen-
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the preparation of audits' 7 8 and concluded that a breach of this
section 17(a) duty "gives rise to an implied private right of action
for damages in favor of a broker-dealer's customers .... "1179
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a seven to one majority of the
Supreme Court,8 0 began: "Once again, we are called upon to decide whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one. During this Term alone, we have been asked to
undertake this task no fewer than five times in cases in which we
have granted certiorari."'' In reversing the Second Circuit, Justice Rehnquist, using Justice Brennan's original language from
Cort, referred to the factors expressed there as being only "relevant": "[Cort] did not decide that each of these factors is entitled
to equal weight. The central inquiry remains [the second Cort
factor-]whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or
by implication, a private cause of action."' 82 Justice Rehnquist
analyzed the issue of congressional intent by focusing on three elements of statutory construction: statutory language,' 8 3 the legislative history of the statute 84 and the overall statutory scheme,
85
including an application of the exclusio rule.
a. Language-Does the languagepurport to create a private

remedy? 86 In answering this initial question, Justice Rehnquist
pointed to two helpful indices. First, the language must at least
prohibit certain conduct or create a federal right in favor of private parties.' 8 7 In concluding that the language of section 17(a)
tially the same language as the first sentence of the 1970 version of section 17(a). Compare
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970) with 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (1976).
178. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 621 (2d Cir. 1978).
179. Id. at 622.
180. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion applying all four Cori factors. 442 U.S.
at 580-83. See notes 208-14 infra and accompanying text. Justice Powell took no part in
the determination of the case.
181. 442 U.S. at 562 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)).
182. 442 U.S. at 575. "The present Court, mindful of preserving the vitality of democratic processes, may be more deferential to the legislative judgments, it is more likely to
give some weight to federalism, and it is more conventional in demanding compliance with
jurisdictional and standing requirements." Powell, What the Justices are Saying, 62
A.B.A.J. 1455 (1976).
183. 442 U.S. at 569-71.
184. Id. at 571.
185. Id. at 571-74.
186. Id. at 568.
187. Id. at 569 (citing, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (federal right to receive equality of treatment in federally funded education programs regard-
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does not prohibit conduct or create rights, Justice Rehnquist noted
that section 17(a) requires only that certain individuals keep
records and file reports as prescribed by the SEC.' Second, the
language must not be forward-looking and seeking to forestall an
event, but must instead be retrospective and provide recompense
after the event."8 9 Justice Rehnquist stated that section 17(a) is
forward-looking because it seeks to forestall insolvency of brokerdealers by providing the Commission with sufficient warning of
the financial collapse of a broker-dealer. Section 17(a), he concluded, does not reflect on an event such as insolvency and does
not seek to provide recompense. 190 After applying these two factors, Justice Rehnquist answered the first question in the negative
and concluded that the language of the statute did not purport to
create a private remedy.' 91
b. Legislative histor--Does the legislative history suggest an
intent by Congress to either create or deny private remedies? 92 In
answering this question, Justice Rehnquist warned that if the legislative history is silent, then "implying a private right of action
.. . is a hazardous enterprise, at best."' 193 With respect to section
17(a), Justice Rehnquist stated that "the legislative history of the
1934 Act simply does not speak to the issue of private remedies
under § 17(a)."' 94 He found, therefore, no support for an implied
private remedy. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the legislative
history does not support a finding that Congress intended to create
an implied private right for the enforcement of section 17(a).
less of sex); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (federal right to
receive equal employment opportunities regardless of race); Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (fraud is prohibited conduct under the Exchange Act); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (federal right to
convey a leasehold of realty coupled with a club membership regardless of race); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (federal right to vote regardless of state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of race); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (federal right to purchase a home regardless of
race); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (the issuance of false or misleading proxy
solicitation materials is prohibited conduct under the Exchange Act)).
188. 442 U.S. at 569. See note 177 supra.
189. 442 U.S. at 570 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 79).
190. Id. at 570-71. See note 177 supra.
191. 442 U.S. at 571.
192. Id.
193. Id But see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432, stating: "While this language
[section 14(a)] makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief
purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial
relief where necessary to achieve that result."
194. 442 U.S. at 576.
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c. Statutory scheme-Does the statutory scheme allow for a
private remedy? 95 Justice Rehnquist, citing two reasons, an-

swered this question in the negative. First, he thought it highly
improbable that Congress
absentmindedly forgot to mention an
1 96
implied private action.

Since section 17(a) is flanked by section
16(b) 19 7 and section 18(a)"'9 of the Exchange Act, both of which
explicitly grant private causes of action, it seems evident that Congress certainly could have created a private remedy in section
17(a) if it had so intended. 99 Second, Justice Rehnquist applied
the exclusio rule, stating that when a statute expressly provides a
particular remedy or remedies, a court must be cautious of reading other remedies into the statute. 2°° Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that section 18(a) may have been intended to be the
exclusive remedy for misstatements in reports filed with the
SEC.2 ' Yet, the Court declined to decide whether section 18(a)
195. Id. at 571.
196. Id. at 572 (referring to Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 741 (Powell,
J., dissenting)). In Cannon, after pointing out that in the four years after Cort was decided

twenty courts of appeals' decisions implied private actions from federal statutes, Justice
Powell remarked: "It defies reason to believe that in each of these statutes Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Section 16(b) was designed to protect outside shareholders against short-swing speculation by insiders with advance information.
"Short-swing transactions in securities are those in which a purchase and sale or sale and
purchase by the same person occur within a six month period." D. VAGTs, supra note 3, at
833. Section 16(b), as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer
in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
same thereafter ....
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Section 18(a), as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976),
provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided
in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which statement was at the time and
in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement,
for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in
any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
199. 442 U.S. at 572.
200. Id. at 572-74.
201. Specifically, the Court noted that:
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provided the exclusive remedy for a violation of section 17(a).
Justice Relnquist instead reasoned that because the remedial provisions of section 18(a) were enacted contemporaneously with section 17(a), the Court would remain extremely reluctant to imply
17(a) a remedy broader than that provided in section
from section
20 2
18(a).
The plaintiff in Touche Ross, Redington, argued that the
Court's inquiry under Cort should not end with statutory construction; the Court should also consider whether an implied private remedy was necessary to effectuate Congress' purpose in
passing the statute and whether the action was one traditionally
relegated to state law.2 "3 Redington contended that such considerations supported the cause of action, urging that private enforcement of section 17(a) was an essential supplement to SEC action
and that section 17(a) was "a matter of federal, not state, concern." 204 Justice Rehnquist responded that the four Cort factors
were merely "relevant" and not necessarily entitled to equal
weight.205 He reasoned that, since all three statutory construction
questions were answered in the negative, Congress obviously did
not intend to create either an express or an implied private remedy
under section 17(a).216
In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that all four Cort factors should be examined, not just the second Cort factor regarding
Senator Fletcher in introducing the bill that formed the basis for the 1934 Act,
stated that "Section [18] imposes civil liability for false or misleading statements
inany of the reports or records required under this act." Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange, testified at length regarding the 1934 Act

proposals. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, he
indicated his understanding that § 18(a) liability extended to "persons transacting
business in securities."

Id. at 574 n.15 (emphasis supplied).
202. Id. at 573. But see Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding

that a cause of action may be maintained under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, even
though the defendant's conduct also constitutes a violation of section 18(a)).
203. 442 U.S. at 575.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 575-76. Redington, citing Borak, also argued that section 27, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1976) (set forth in note 62 supra), grants jurisdiction to federal courts over violations of the Exchange Act. Id. at 576. In response, Justice Rehnquist stated:

The reliance... on § 27 is misplaced. Section 27 grants jurisdiction to the federal courts and provides for venue and service of process. It creates no cause of
action of its own force and effect; it imposes no liabilities. The source of plaintiffs'
right must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act which
they seek to enforce, not in thejurisdictional provision .... The Court in.8orak
found a private cause of action implicit in § 14(a).
Id. at 577.
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legislative intent.2 °7 Justice Marshall would have answered the
first Cori factor in the affirmative because brokerage firm customers were the "favored wards" of section 17(a) and were, therefore,
to be especially benefited by the statute.2 °8 In analyzing the
second Cort factor, Justice Marshall employed Justice Rehnquist's
three-pronged statutory construction inquiry. First, Justice Marshall determined that the statutory language creates a private remedy because section 17(a) "does impose duties for the benefit of
private parties; in that sense, it both generates expectations, on
which customers may appropriately rely, that those duties will be
performed, and prohibits conduct inconsistent with the obligations created. ' 20 9 Second, he acknowledged the silence of legislative history as to private remedies under section 17(a). 210 Third,
Justice Marshall argued that the exclusio rule should not apply to
section 17(a) because the damage remedy in section 18(a) is of no
help to brokerage customers. He noted that "false reports regarding a broker's financial condition would not affect the price of securities held by the broker's customers,"'21 and hence would not
generate damages under section 18(a).21 2 Justice Marshall concluded, therefore, that the second Cori factor should have been
satisfied.
Justice Marshall agreed with Redington that the third Cort
factor should have been answered affirmatively because private
enforcement of section 17(a) is necessary to supplement Commission action.21 3 He also agreed that the fourth Cort factor should
have been supportive because "enforcement of [the Exchange
Act's] ...reporting provisions is plainly not a matter of traditional state concern, but rather relates to the effectiveness of federal statutory requirements. ' 214 Thus, Justice Marshall would
have held all of the Cort factors to have been satisfied and would
have implied a private damage remedy under section 17(a).
2. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis
The most recent case to address the issue of implied private
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 580 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 581 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at.582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See note 198 supra.
442 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 582-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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causes of action, TransamericaMortgageAdvisors,Inc. v. Lewis,2 15

applied the Touche Ross standard of implication to two sections of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act).216 Lewis,
a shareholder of a trust which Transamerica advised and managed, brought a derivative action on behalf of the trust and a class
action on behalf of the trust's shareholders. 217 Lewis sought damages for an alleged breach of Transamerica's fiduciary duty under
section 206 and rescission of the contract under section 215 of the
Advisers Act.218 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that an implied private remedy for damages existed under section
206 and a similar right to equitable relief existed under section
215.219

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of appeals' decision regarding the right of rescission under section 215.
Justice Stewart wrote that section 215 of the Advisers Act did af215. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See Underwood, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.

Lewis: An Analysis of the Supreme Court'sD fnition of an Implied Right of Action, 7 PEpPER NE L. REv. 533 (1980).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (1976).
217. 444 U.S. at 13.
218. Id. Section 206, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to
or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than
such client, knowingly to effect [sic] any sale or purchase of any security for the
account of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the
consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph shall
not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker
or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Section 215, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976), provides in pertinent part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and every
contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of any
provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be
void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of
any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a
party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual
knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such
contract was in violation of any such provision.
219. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237, 239 (9th Cir. 1978).
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ford a private right of action; the language of section 215 on its
face renders void all contracts made in violation of the Advisers
Act. Justice Stewart observed: "By declaring certain contracts
void, § 215 by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of
voidness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere." 0
The more difficult question facing the Court was whether section 206 afforded Lewis a private right of action for damages. In a
five to four decision on this issue, the Court held that section 206
does not afford a private damage remedy. 2 Justice Stewart,
again writing for the majority, reached this holding by declaring
that the central issue was whether Congress intended to create a
private damage remedy under section 206.22 To determine congressional intent, Justice Stewart employed the Touche Ross statutory construction analysis and inquired into the statute's language,
legislative history and scheme of enforcement.
Justice Stewart answered the first Touche Ross question in the
negative, noting that the statutory language neither created nor
altered any civil liabilities.22 He answered the second Touche
Ross question in the negative also, asserting that there was positive evidence of congressional intent not to authorize private damage actions under section 206.2 In answering the third Touche
Ross question, Justice Stewart noted that the Advisers Act provides express remedies for enforcing section 206.1 Therefore,
Justice Stewart concluded that the exclusio rule applied to section
206 and eliminated the possibility of implied remedies. 226 The

Court held, in accordance with Touche Ross, that negative responses to the three Touche Ross questions constituted sufficient
evidence
of congressional intent to deny a private damage rem22 7
edy.
220. 444 U.S. at 18.
221. Id. at 24 (Burger, CJ., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, J.J., join Stewart, J.
White, J., was joined in dissent by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.).
222. Id. at 15-16.
223. Id. at 19, 24.
224. Id. at 21-22. Justice Stewart pointed out that the early drafts of section 214, the
Advisers Act's jurisdictional provision, gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by" the statute.
Id. (emphasis supplied). Section 214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976), as finally enacted "omitted any references to 'actions at law' or to 'liability.' Id. at 22. "The unexplained deletion of a single phrase . . is, of course, not determinative. . . . But it is one more piece
of evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action for anything beyond

limited equitable relief." Id.
225. Id. at 20. See 15 U.S.C.
226. Id. at 19-20.
227. Id. at 23-24.

§§

80b-3, 80b-9, 80b-17 (1976).

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(d)

1981]

The dissent in Transamerica paralleled the dissent in Touche
Ross by arguing that the proper standard for implication was the
entire four-part Cort test. Justice White, writing for the dissent,
found that the first Cort factor had been satisfied because section
206 was intended to protect investors like the plaintiff. 8 He disputed the majority's treatment of Congress' intent under the
second Cort factor by taking issue with the majority's analysis of
the legislative history. According to Justice White, the legislative
history did not weigh against implication. 9 After determining
that the first two Cort factors were satisfied, Justice White examined the remaining Cort factors and decided that they militated
in favor of implication. 3 Because each of the Cort factors had
been satisfied, Justice White concluded that the Court should imply a private damage remedy. 3 1
3.

CongressionalCriticism

Touche Ross and Transamericahave deemed congressional intent to be the critical issue when an implied private cause of action
is asserted and have compelled courts to examine the statutory
language, the statute's legislative history and the enforcement
scheme of the pertinent statute. In recent amendments to the federal securities laws,2 2 Congress criticized Touche Ross' and Transameica's focus on "strict construction of statutory language and
expressed intent" as the standard for judicial implication of private remedies.3 3 Congress praised the Borak opinion's rationale
which recognized a private remedy whenever it was necessary to
Congress intended:
effectuate Congress' statutory purpose.'
228. Id. at 25 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White pointed out that the language of

section 206 is "substantially similar" to the language of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980), "both of which
have been held to create private rights of action for which damages may be recovered." Id.
at 25 n.l (citing Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)).
229. 444 U.S. at 31 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White dealt with the majority's discussion of the omission of the words "actions at law," discussed in note 224 supra, and
concluded that "the significance of this omission is delphic at best." 444 U.S. at 31 (White,

J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 34-36 (White, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 36 (White, J., dissenting).
232. Small Business Investment Incentive Act, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275

(1980).
233. H.R. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 n.6, reprimedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEWS 4810 n.6.
234. Id. at 28, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4810. See notes
60-68 supra.
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to make plain that it expects the courts to imply private rights
of action under this legislation [the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act of 19801, where the plaintiff falls within the class
of persons protected by the statutory provision in question.
Such a right would be consistent with and further Congress'
intent in enacting that provision, and such actions would not
improperly
occupy an area traditionally the concern of state
23 5
law.

This criticism of Touche Ross and Transamerica, however, is
not dispositive of the question of an issuing corporation's standing
to seek implied injunctive relief under section 13(d) of the Wilhams Act; by its terms it is applicable only to the Small Business
Incentive Act. Nevertheless, the criticism appears to indicate what
Congress might consider to be the test for implication of private
remedies if the Williams Act were amended in the future.
III.

THE APPLICATION

OF TOUCHE ROSS TO SECTION

13(d)

A purchaser who has filed a false or misleading Schedule 13D
is liable for damages under section 18(a) to any person "who, in
reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement ....
"I'
If no Schedule 13D is filed or the purchaser fails to remedy the
defective Schedule 13D, the SEC may seek injunctive relief under
section 21 to compel the filing of a truthful Schedule 13D.1 7 The
SEC, however, does not always expeditiously seek injunctive relief
in the federal courts.138 Under such circumstances, the task of enforcing section 13(d) and compelling the filing of a truthful Schedule 13D becomes the responsibility of the issuing corporation and
its shareholders." 9 Yet, the issuer's shareholders generally lack
either the resources or the incentive to maintain an injunctive action.24° Moreover, section 13(d) provides no cause of action for
the issuing corporation "seeking equitable or prophylactic re235. Id. at 29, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4811 (citing Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976) (set forth in full in note 198 supra).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
238. See notes 296-323 infra and accompanying text.
239. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,719 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972).
240. Id. The shareholders may be able to seek injunctive relief as a class, thereby defraying the cost of obtaining equitable relief. But see note 289 infra. For the availability of
attorneys' fees, compare Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-92 (1970) (com-

pelling payment of litigation costs by the corporation which had violated the securities laws
rather than by plaintiffs) with Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240,

247-71 (1975) (denying recovery of attorneys' fees to the prevailing litigant).

19811
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lief-not monetary damages--[in order] to take the necessary
steps to effectuate the purposes of section 13(d)."'24 Thus, the validity of an issuer's implied cause of action for injunctive relief
under section 13(d) must be determined by an application of
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.42
A. Language-Doesthe LanguagePurportto Create
a Private Remedy?

If a court seeks to imply a private cause of action for injunctive
relief on behalf of an issuing corporation, it must address the first
Touche Ross question: Does the language of section 13(d) suggest
an intent by Congress to create such a private remedy?243 Section
13(d) reads in pertinent part:
Any person who, [after acquiring certain stock], is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of
[certain stock] shall ... send to the issuer ... and file with the
Commission, a statement containing ... information ... as
the Commission may ... prescribe as necessary or apropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. '

To answer this first Touche Ross question, the court must determine whether the statutory language either creates a federal
right in the plaintiff or prohibits certain conduct for the benefit of
the plaintiff.24 An example of a federal right created by statute
can be found in Cannon v. University of Chicago.246 In that case, it

was held that Title IX, with the admonition that "no person...
shall, on the basis of sex . . . be subject to discrimination," 247

vested plaintiff Cannon with the federal right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sex and accordingly implied a private
remedy to enforce that right. An example of statutory language
that prohibits conduct can be found in JL Case Co. v. Borak,248
where it was held that section 14(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits
improper proxy solicitation for the benefit of investors. 249 Section
241. 453 F.2d at 720 n.22.
242. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See notes 173-214 supra and accompanying text.
243. 442 U.S. at 568.
244. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 11979) (set forth in full in note 7 supra) (emphasis
added).
245. 442 U.S. at 569.
246. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
247. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
248. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
249. 377 U.S. at 431. According to Justice Clark, "the purpose of 14(a) is to prevent
management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation." Id.
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14(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the [jurisdictional means] ... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-

tors, to solicit
or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
°
proxy.

In contrast to Title IX, which creates a federal right, and section 14(a), which prohibits conduct, the terms of section 13(d) only
require the purchaser to send a Schedule 13D to the SEC and the
issuing corporation. The issuing corporation has the right to receive a truthful Schedule 13D, but this "right" is granted for the
direct benefit of the issuer's shareholders, not for the benefit of the
corporation in its issuing capacity35 1 Thus, as one court has
noted, "Section 13(d) does not by its terms create or alter civil
liability; rather, it simply requires certain conduct.

'2 52

The statutory language inquiry of Touche Ross also considered
whether the language of the statute is forward-looking or retrospective. 253 If the language is forward-looking, it weighs against
implication. If the language is retrospective, it weighs in favor of
implication.254 The language of section 13(d) is similar to the language of section 17(a) which was construed in Touche Ross.2"
Section 17(a) provides in pertinent part: "[Elvery broker or dealer
registered pursuant to.. .this title, shallmake, keep, andpreserve
. . .such accounts,corresondence,.., and make such reports, as
the Commission. . .may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 25 6 Justice

Rehnquist determined that this language was forward-looking:
"In terms, § 17(a) simply requires broker-dealers and others to
. . .file such reports as the Commission may prescribe. It does

not, by its terms, purport to create a private cause of action in
favor of anyone. ' 25 7 Similarly, the language of section 13(d) is

forward-looking in that purchasers "shall send" certain reports
250. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (set forth in full in note 61 supra) (emphasis added).
251. See notes 324-26 infra and accompanying text.
252. Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, 495 F. Supp. 92, 99 (N.D. MlL1980),
discussed in text accompanying notes 100-18 supra.

253. 442 U.S. at 570.
254. See note 189 supra and accompanying text.
255. Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358, 360 (E.D. Wis. 1980), discussed in text accompanying notes 127-31 supra.
256. 15 U.S.C. 78q(a) (1976) (set forth in full in note 177 supra) (emphasis added).
257. 442 U.S. at 569.
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"in the public interest or for the protection of investors."' '

8

Thus,

under Touche Ross, section 13(d) seems to weigh against implication.
An example of retrospective language can be found in section
215 of the Advisers Act2 59 which was scrutinized in Transamerica
MortgageAdvisors, Inc. v. Lewis. 2" Section 215 reads in pertinent
part: "Every contract made in violation . . .[of this subchapter]
. . .shall be void ....,,26' Transamerica implied a private remedy from this language, stating: "By declaring certain contracts
void, § 215 by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of
voidness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere." 2 62 Thus,
section 215 provides recompense after the occurrence of violative
conduct. If a contract is made in violation of the Advisers Act,
section 215 provides that such a contract shall be void. While section 215 provides a remedy for a wrong, however, section 13(d)
does not; section 13(d) merely requires purchasers to send a
Schedule 13D to the SEC and to the issuing corporation. It appears, therefore, that section 13(d) was intended to forestall harm
to the shareholder, rather than to provide recompense for wrong263
doing.
The terms of section 13(d) neither create a federal right in the
issuing corporation, nor prohibit conduct for the benefit of the issuer. Moreover, the language of section 13(d) is forward-looking
rather than retrospective. Thus, the language of section 13(d) does
not suggest an intent by Congress to create a private cause of action for injunctive relief in the issuing corporation. Accordingly,
the first Touche Ross statutory construction question must be answered in the negative.
B. Legislative History-Does The Legislative History Suggest
an Intent by Congressto either Create
or Deny PrivateRemedies?
In determining the propriety of implication, Touche Ross next
considered whether the legislative history purports to create or
258. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) (set forth in full in note 7 supra).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) (set forth in part in note 218 supra).
260. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See notes 214-31 supra and accompanying text.
261. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) (set forth in part in note 218 supra) (emphasis added).
262. 444 U.S. at 18-19. See L. Loss, 3 SEcuRITIEs REGULATIONS 1758-59 (2d ed.
1961). Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976), is a voiding provi-

sion similar to section 215 of the Advisers Act. For an application of section 29(b), see
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970).
263. See notes 324-26 infra and accompanying text.
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deny private relief to a plaintiff. Although Congress was silent as
to private causes of action under section 13(d), 2 4 the legislative
history of the Williams Act does offer some interpretive assistance.
Two pieces of legislative history appear to weigh in favor of implication, whereas other legislative history appears to weigh against
implication.
First, the House Report of the Williams Act notes that the
SEC believed that the Act would add
little cost, if any, to the administration of the securities laws. 265 This comment, reflective of
the SEC's view and not that of Congress, suggests that the burden
of enforcement would be on private parties rather than on the
Commission.266 Second, Professor Israels, in a submission to the
hearings on the Williams Act, wrote:
Presumably we may assume that the Commission will be able
to enforce the provision of this Bill ... and of its rules there-

under by proceedings for injunction in the Federal courts; and
that under [Borak] a private litigant could seek similar relief
before or after the significant fact such as the acceptance of his
tender of securities.
This reasoning was asserted by the defeated tender offeror in ]iper
v. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc. 261 who argued that since Congress
was aware of Borak when it passed the Williams Act, "Congress
was [also] aware that private actions were implicit in [the Williams
Act]." 2' 69 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Piper,
rejected such logic:
[T]his conclusion places more weight on the passing reference
to [Borak] than can be reasonably carried. Only last Term we
indicated that similar materials in the legislative history of the
264. Touche Ross warned that "implying a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise at best." 442 U.S. at 571. This warning is not

very helpful, however, because if a private remedy is sought, the plaintiff will undoubtedly
have conceded the absence of an explicit private remedy. If Congress had spoken to the
issue, a court's task would be easy. As the Court in Transamerica pointed out, however,
"the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available." 444 U.S. at 18 (citing
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 694).
265. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 49, at 7, reprintedin[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 2817.

266. The Commission's "presumed 'expertise' in the securities-law field is of limited
value when the narrow legal issue is one peculiarly reserved for judicial resolution, namely
whether a cause of action should be implied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particular class of litigants." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,41 n.27 (1977).
267. Senate Hearings,supra note 5, at 67.

268. 430 U.S. at 31. See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
at 32 n.8 (White, J., dissenting).
269. 430 U.S. at 31.
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1934 Act were of limited value. "Remarks of this kind made in
the course of legislative debate or hearings other than by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a bill are
entitled to little weight." 2 ° "

The legislative history of the Williams Act does not uniformly
support implied causes of action. For example, the statement in
the House Report that the Williams Act "avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bid" 271 weighs against implication. Timing is crucial to the success or failure of takeover attempts by the preliminary acquisition of stock on the open
market.272 Such acquisitions are often precursors of cash tender
offers 273 and if a purchaser can be delayed in the takeover attempt, the issuer can take advantage of several defensive tactics.274
Therefore, a private cause of action for injunctive relief in the
hands of the issuing corporation would provide an effective tool
for the delay and perhaps defeat a takeover attempt by the purchaser.
Thus, it appears that the legislative history of section 13(d)
does not expressly speak to private causes of action nor does the
general legislative history of the Williams Act indicate an intent
by Congress to create such a remedy under section 13(d). Neither
the SEC's statement concerning the cost of enforcement nor Professor Israels' remark about Borak is given appreciable weight by
the Court. Moreover, it may be argued that Congress' desire to
maintain neutrality weighs against implication because a private
cause of action for injunctive relief, if misused by the issuing corporation, would frustrate Congress' express desire not to tip the
balance of regulation. The legislative history of section 13(d),
therefore, does not suggest congressional intent to create a private
270. Id. at 31, n.20 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976)).
271. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 49, at 3, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 2813.
272. See generally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN

199 (1977).
273. I1d. at 10-14.
274. W. PAINTER, sutpra note 47, at 404 n.44. Defensive tactics include:
arranging a so-called "defensive" merger with another company ....
repurchasing shares, issuing more shares to a "friendly" party, increasing the dividend,
splitting the stock, reincorporating in a state which has relatively strict rules on
tender offers. . . , classifying the board of directors, amending the company's

TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

articles of incorporation or bylaws to require a high percentage of shareholder
vote, or a class vote, to authorize mergers or other acquisitions, and inserting
provisions in loan agreements or pension plans accelerating the maturity date of

corporate obligations in the event of a change in control.
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cause of action for injunctive relief for the issuer. Thus, the
second Touche Ross statutory construction question must also be

answered in the negative.
C. Statutory Scheme-Does the Statutory Scheme Allow
for a Private Remedy?
The final question that Touche Ross posed to determine congressional intent was whether the statutory scheme allows for the
implication of private remedies. In answering this question, Justice Rehnquist made two assumptions. The first assumption was
that Congress knows how to create express private causes of action and, therefore, implied rights of action should be the exception, not the rule. 7 A plaintiff, however, could cite two occasions
upon which the Court has declined to afford conclusive weight to
this assumption; the Court has recognized implied causes of action
under section 14(a) in Borak 7 6 and under section 10(b) in Superintendent of Insurancev. BankersLife & Casualty Co.277 As previously indicated, however, the Court has discredited Borak,278 and
Justice Rehnquist noted in Touche Ross that "this Court simply
• . . acquiesced in the 25-year-old acceptance by the lower federal

courts of an implied action under § 10(b)." 27 9 In contrast, the history of implied private remedies under section 13(d) is limited to
the decade since 1971 when GAFCorp. v. Milstein28 was decided.
The second assumption made by Justice Rehnquist in Touche
Ross was that an express remedy in a statutory scheme excludes
all other remedies--the exclusio rule.28' A violation of section
13(d), like all other violations of the Exchange Act, is subject to an
explicit administrative remedy. The SEC has express authority to
investigate a section 13(d) violation under section 21(a),282 express
authority to bring suit for an injunction or writ of mandamus
under sections 21(d) and (e) 283 and express authority to submit

evidence of any violation to the Attorney General for possible
275. 442 U.S. at 572. See note 57 supra.
276. 377 U.S. at 431. See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
277. 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
278. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
279. 442 U.S. at 577 n.19.
280. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). See notes 81-90
supra and accompanying text.
281. 442 U.S. at 572-74.
282. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976).
283. Id. §§ 78u(d)-(e).
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criminal proceedings against the violator under section 21(d).2 84
In accordance with this administrative remedy, an issuing corporation which faces a purchaser who neglects to file a truthful
Schedule 13D should urge the SEC to seek an injunction under
section 21. It would then be within the SEC's discretion to pursue
the matter. Yet, the SEC may hesitate to bring suit when a takeover is imminent. As Manuel F. Cohen, former Chairman of the
SEC, stated at the Williams Act hearings:
[O]ur concern really stems from sensitivity that the Government should stay out of involvement in these contests as much
as possible .... We just did not want the Commission to be in

the position perhaps of compelling changes or going to court
because once you do that no matter how well you qualify what
you are doing it is going to be used by the other parties as an
argument that "the Government is against you." This is the
reason why the Commission hesitates, unless no other course is
possible, to go to court on these situations.2",
Regardless of the SEC's hesitation, a strict application of the exclusio rule would deny the issuer an2 86implied cause of action for
injunctive relief under section 13(d).

Thus, an issuing corporation, faced with a violation of section
13(d) by a purchaser, is left without the swift injunctive relief
which would compel a purchaser to file a truthful Schedule 13D.
Instead, the exclusio rule limits the issuer's remedy to the express
administrative remedy provided by section 21. Although this
technique of statutory construction may appear to sanction injustice, a majority of the Touche Ross Court accepted the rule as a
method of limiting the implication of private remedies under the
federal securities laws.
Because Congress created an express administrative remedy
for the enforcement of the Exchange Act in section 21, the exclusio rule and Touche Ross compel the conclusion that the statutory scheme of section 13(d) does not suggest congressional intent
284. Id. § 78u(d). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976) (providing for criminal liability).
285. House Hearings, supra note 44, at 53 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen). Justice
Stevens, dissenting in Piper, stated:

Although originally one might have argued that the private remedies created by
the Securities Acts are limited to those expressly described in the legislation itself
history forecloses any such argument today. The statutes originally enacted in
1933 and 1934 have been amended so often with full congressional awareness of
the judicial interpretation of Rule lOb-5 as implicitly creating a private remedy,
that we must now assume that Congress intended to create rights for the specific
beneficiaries of the legislation as well as duties to be policed by the SEC.
430 U.S. at 55 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. See text accompanying note 211 supra.
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to create a private cause of action for injunctive relief in the issuing corporation. The third Touche Ross statutory construction
question, therefore, must also be answered in the negative.
In sum, Gateway Industries,Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car287 and
Sta-Rite Industries,Inc. v. Nortek, Inc. 288 applied the Touche Ross

statutory construction standard for implication and found that issuing corporations do not have an implied cause of action for injunctive relief under section 13(d). The language, legislative
history and statutory scheme of enforcement under section 13(d)
were held to weigh against implication.289
Pier v. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc. ,290 which predated Touche

Ross, did recognize that in special circumstances the Court should
look beyond principles of statutory construction to policy considerations when implying a private remedy. Although Chief Justice
Burger denied the defeated tender offeror an implied damage
remedy in ]iper because it was "unncessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes in adopting the Williams Act,"29 ' he
nevertheless observed that private injunctive relief might be neces287. 495 F. Supp. 92, 99 (N.D. Ill.
1980). See notes 100-18 supra and accompanying
text.
288. 494 F. Supp. 358, 363 (E.D. Wis. 1980). See notes 127-31 supra and accompany-

ing text.
289. The issuer in Gateway argued that if standing were denied to the corporation qua
corporation, then the issuing corporation should be granted standing as a representative of
its shareholders. The issuer's standing as a representative of its shareholders, however,
would still require a court to imply a private cause of action for the shareholders. The
Gateway court admitted that for a corporate shareholder, implication would be a "closer
question." 495 F. Supp. at 99. Further, Gateway stated, "[It is clear from the statutory
language and legislative history that shareholders are the intended beneficiaries of the disclosure requirements of section 13(d)." Id. at 100.
The plaintiff in Transamericaalso appeared to be a member of a class to be especially
benefited by a federal statute (section 206 of the Advisers Act), but the language, legislative
history and scheme of enforcement of the statute dictated the denial of a private remedy.
See notes 215-31 supra and accompanying text. Justice Stewart wrote: "The mere fact
that the statute was designed to protect advisors' clients does not require the implication of
a private cause of action for damages on their behalf." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 24. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 578.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, Justice Stevens attempted to delineate the "especially benefited" factor as the "most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a
cause of action." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13. The majority in
Transamerica, however, evidently rejected this factor as a litmus test for implication of
private causes of action. 444 U.S. at 20. Under the Touche Ross analysis, as applied by
Transamerica,the issuing corporation could not assert an implied remedy as a representative of its shareholders, because the shareholders themselves do not have an implied remedy under section 13(d). Id. at 24.
290. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
291. Id. at 41.
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292
sary to provide for effective enforcement of the Williams Act.
The Chief Justice remarked that "in corporate control contests the
stage of preliminary injunctive relief, rather than post-contest lawsuits, 'is the time when relief can best be given.' "293
According to this reasoning, Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Lim295
ited 29 4 and Kirsch Co. v. Bliss and Laughlin Industries, Inc.
might have been correct in implying an injunctive action for the
issuing corporation. The validity of this conclusion, however, depends upon finding that the policy of supplemental enforcement is
strong enough to override the strict principles of statutory construction set forth in Touche Ross.
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. Supplemental Enforcement
Despite the fact that the SEC is expressly authorized to enforce
section 13(d) violations, the Commission admits that it is
overburdened and frequently unable to adequately police the Williams Act provisions.296 Consequently, the SEC contends that private causes of action are necessary to effectuate the congressional
purpose of protecting investors, including an issuing corporation's
shareholders, through the Williams Act.297 Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redingon, 293 however, rejected a similar argument: "We need
not reach the merits of the arguments concerning the 'necessity' of
implying a private remedy... , we believe such inquiries have
little relevance to the decision of this case. '299 Justice Rehnquist
reached this result by reasoning that negative responses to the statutory construction questions were sufficient to indicate that Congress did not intend to provide a private damage remedy under
292. Id. at 42 n.28.
293. Id. at 42 (citing Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969) (opinion by Friendly, J.)).
294. 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981), discussed
in text accompanying notes 91-99 supra.
295. 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980), discussed in text accompanying notes 119-26
supra.
296. The SEC insists that "'[even more necessary [than in Borak] are such private
rights of action to supplement SEC actions to effectuate the congressional purposes in enacting the Williams Act,' Brief for SEC asAmicus Curiae 12." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
dissenting). The Piper majority rejected this arguInc., 430 U.S. 64 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
ment. Id. at 41 n.27.
297. See 430 U.S. at 64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
298. 442 U.S. 560 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 173-214 supra.
299. 442 U.S. at 575.
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section 17(a) of the Exchange Act.3° The plaintiff in Touche Ross
responded that a denial of supplemental enforcement sanctions
injustice. Yet, Justice Relmquist maintained that the Court is
"not at liberty to legislate. If there is to be a federal damages remedy. . . Congress must provide it. '[I]t is not for [the Court] to fill
any hiatus Congress has left in this area.' ",301
Notwithstanding the Court's rejection of the supplemental enforcement argument, the burden on the SEC to enforce the federal
securities laws may be a substantial impediment to meaningful enforcement. Each year the SEC must review all of the filings required by the federal securities laws. Between 1969 and 1976, the
number of filings made with the SEC pursuant to the Williams
Act alone had increased from 321 to 1,184.302 Moreover, the SEC
annually receives several thousand complaints from private parties seeking redress.3 °3 The SEC investigates between 1,000 to
1,500 of these complaints for possible violations of the federal securities laws 3 4 and institutes approximately 100 injunctive actions
305
annually.
These figures illustrate the increasing burden upon the SEC
and indicate the necessity of supplemental enforcement. In 1971,
the GAF Corp. v. Milstein3 °6 opinion asserted: "It is no answer to
the query whether the issuer has standing to seek injunctive relief
to respond that the Commission can proceed under penal provisions. 30 7 Yet nine years later, when the SEC's burden of enforcing the securities laws had increased at least three-fold,30 8 Sta-Rite
300. Id. at 575-76.
301. Id. at 579 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (emphasis sup-

plied)).
302. Pitt, supra note 164, at 164 n.352. As the SEC indicated:
[L]itigation alleging fraud by one side or the other in a contested tender offer
occurs almost weekly. It is almost standard operating procedure. We have had to
respond that we will investigate allegations of fraud to the extent they fall within
our jurisdiction, and indeed we have. But owing to the time required for such
investigations, it may be that the tender offer will be all over before the investigation is completed.
House Hearings, supra note 44, at 19. When Piper was decided, the SEC's professional
staff in the Office of Tender Offers, Acquisitions and Small Issues was composed of only
four professionals. Pitt, supra note 164, at 164 n.356.
303. SEC, 36TH ANNUAL REPORT 93 (1970).
304. SEC, 45TH ANNUAL REPORT 121 (1979).

305. Id. at 122.
306. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
307. Id. at 721.
308. Compare SEC, 36TH ANNUAL REPORT 224 (1970) with SEC, 45TH ANNUAL REPORT 122 (1979).
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Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., adopting Gatewvay Industries,
Inc. v. Agency. Rent A Car's 0Oreasoning, answered the issuer's
query with this response: "Instead, it is for the private issuing corporation, or its shareholders, to raise the issue of noncompliance
initially with the SEC, and not the courts. It is then incumbent
upon the SEC to investigate and bring an action in district court if
it deems such to be necessary."' 31

It appears that these courts

have ignored an obvious fact: without supplemental enforcement
countless violations of section 13(d) will go unremedied and the
congressional purpose of closing the gap in the federal securities
laws will be undermined substantially.
The plaintiff in IL Case Co. v. Borak312 was successful when
he outlined such a scenario and the Court sustained his action in
the name of supplemental enforcement.3? 1 3 Yet fifteen years later,
Touche Ross rejected the same argument:
The invocation of the "remedial purposes" of the 1934 Act is
similarly unavailing. Only last Term, we emphasized that generalized references to the "remedial purposes" of the 1934 Act
will not justify reading a provision "more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit." The ultimate question is one of Congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve
314upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.
A significant deviation from this recent line of authority arose in
Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Limited, 5 where the Fourth Circuit apparently chose to ignore Justice Rehnquist's rejection of the supplemental enforcement argument, stating: "[A] court simply
cannot turn a blind eye to a potentially inaccurate filing when it
possesses the injunctive power to have that filing corrected before
irreparable harm occurs to the investing public. ' 31 6 It is presently

uncertain whether the supplemental enforcement argument, as it
applies to section 13(d), will be accepted by the federal courts
309. 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
310. 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. I 1980).

311. 494 F. Supp. at 362-63. See also 495 F. Supp. at 98.
312. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
313. Id. at 432.
314. 442 U.S. at 578 (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 10.3, 116 (1978)). In Sloan, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the SEC did not have the authority under
section 12(k) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976), to issue a series of orders
suspending the trading in a stock beyond the initial 10-day suspension period based on the
same set of circumstances. Id. at 114. The SEC had urged that such action was required
for the protection of investors. Id. at 114-15.
315. 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), ceri. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981).
316. Id. at 1227.
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which have yet to consider the issue. It is noteworthy, however,
3 17
that the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Dan River.
If this policy argument is accepted by other courts, as it was by
the Fourth Circuit in Dan River, the issuing corporation will generally be in the best position to assert an implied injunctive action:
The statute requires a copy of the statement to be sent by regis-

tered mail to the issuer (this provision alone might support the
issuer's standing), and the issuer, in the course of constantly
monitoring transactions in its stock, better than anyone else will
know when there has been a failure to fie. Moreover, the issuer has not only the resources, but the self-interest so vital to
maintaining an injunctive action.318
The shareholder, however, although able to gain access to the
Schedule 13D,31 9 does not have the issuing corporation's immediate access to the Schedule 13D. Likewise, the shareholder generally has neither the resources nor the incentive to pursue an
injunctive action.320 Moreover, even if a shareholder succeeded in
gaining an injunction against a purchaser, the shareholder could
not collect money damages unless he or she met the pur32 1
chaser/seller and reliance requirements of section 18(a).
In short, the issuer's pursuit of an implied injunctive remedy is
a necessary supplement to SEC action.322 Without such enforcement, the remedial purpose of the Williams Act would be virtually
defeated. 323 Accordingly, the policy consideration of supplemental enforcement to achieve Congress' goal of disclosure under section 13(d) weighs heavily in favor of implying private injunctive
relief on behalf of the issuing corporation.
B.

The Williams Act's Neutrality

The neutrality which Congress intended to be an important
aspect of the Williams Act weighs against permitting an issuing
corporation private injunctive relief. Former Chairman of the
SEC, Manuel F. Cohen, testified before the Senate:
/7Theprincipalpointis that we [the SEC] are not concernedwith
317. 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981).
318. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d at 719 (citation omitted).
319. Because the Schedule 13D must be sent to the SEC and to each exchange where
the security is traded, the Schedule becomes a matter of public record. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) (set forth in full in note 7 supra).
320. 453 F.2d at 721.
321. Id See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
322. 624 F.2d at 1223, 1227; 453 F.2d at 721.
323. 453 F.2d at 720. Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488,492
(W.D. Mich. 1980).
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assistingor hurting eitherside. We are concerned with the inves-

tor who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial welfare.... The investor is lost somewhere in the shuffle. This is
our concern and our only concern.324

Professor Hayes, also before the Senate, stated that neither the
bidder nor the defending management require any additional protection: "Rather, the investor. . . is the one who needs a more
fectie champion . ... 325 Senator Williams made the statement

that the Williams Act was "designedsolely to requirefull andfair
disclosureforthe benefit ofinvestors."326
As evidenced by this legislative history, Congress intended the
Williams Act to be scrupulously neutral and recognized that
"takeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a
useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient
management. ' 327 This policy was announced in response to critics of the Williams Act who believed that if incumbent management were given any additional defensive weapons, those tender
offers which serve as the only realistic method of ousting inefficient management would be hampered.328 One such critic reminded Congress of an incident involving the Boston and Maine
Corporation. The president of that corporation, who had been
convicted of misappropriating corporate property, "was given a
raise in salary and an extension of his employment contract at the
time extensions of employment contracts were given to other officers and directors. 329 In such instances, takeover bids do serve
a useful purpose, and the Williams Act's neutrality would be upset
if the issuing corporation were given the opportunity to enjoin a
purchaser by invoking private relief under section 13(d).
A bidder preparing a takeover will often attempt to establish a
position in the target's securities before announcing a formal
324. Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 178 (cited in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1977) (emphasis in original)).

325. Id. at 57 (cited in 430 U.S. at 29 (emphasis supplied)).
326. 113 CoNG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (cited in 430 U.S. at 31 (emphasis supplied)).

327. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967) (cited in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 n.8 (1975)). See notes 69-80 supra and accompanying text.
328. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. Tender offers had gained popular-

ity because proxy contests had become less effective for various reasons, including: "the
inertia of stockholders, the fact that management had the use of corporate funds to
purchase the securities of a disagreeing shareholder 'to protect corporate policy,' and the
existence of strong allies for management-the investment bankers, institutional lenders,
customers and suppliers, with whom management daily transacted business." Pitt, supra
note 164, at 127.
329. House Hearings,supra note 44, at 63 (statement of Jordan Eskin).
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tender offer 33 ° and such preliminary stock purchases often trigger
a duty to disclose under section 13(d). 33 ' Consequently, when
such a strategy is in effect, the target issuer could forestall the
takeover by initiating litigation after the preparatory stock
purchases.332 This tactic, in the hands of incumbent management,
would certainly upset the neutrality of the Williams Act and could
frustrate the salutory effects of a takeover.
It is important to note that the scope of section 13(d) is not
limited to pre-tender offer acquisitions; any person who acquires a
five percent interest in the issuer must file a Schedule 13D.333 The
purchaser's future intentions do not bear on the obligation to file,
and the purchaser may desire nothing more than a strong voice in
the issuer's affairs. Nevertheless, the possibility of injunction
poses danger in this latter situation; the self-interest of management may operate to still that legitimate voice by enjoining the
purchaser from voting his or her shares.
These concerns were acknowledged, but dismissed, by the Milstein court:
To play upon management's self-interest, of course, raises some
threat to Congress's express desire not to tip the scales in favor
of incumbent management as against the takeover group. But,
this danger can be adequately counteracted if the district court
carefully scrutinizes self-serving management claims allegedly
made in the interest of investor protection.334
Although Milstein recognized this threat to the neutrality of the
Williams Act, it held private enforcement of section 13(d) by the
issuing corporation to be appropriate. 335 The Second Circuit concluded that since the SEC was overburdened and shareholders
lacked both the ability and the incentive to enforce section 13(d)
effectively, corporate action was a necessary supplement to SEC
action.336
In Gateway, the Court rejected Milstein's reasoning, and
stated: "It scarcely would further the goals of section 13(d) to permit an issuing corporation to sue on behalf of some unidentified
330. E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 272, at 10-14.
331. Id.
332. Young, Section 13(d)--A New Element in The Battle For Control of Corporate
Managements: The Implications of GAF Corporationv. Milstein, 27 Bus. LAW. 1137, 1138

(1972).
333.
334.
335.
336.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) (set forth in full in note 7 supra).
453 F.2d at 719-20.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
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group of shareholders who themselves may have no interest in
'
pursuing an action."337
Gateways conclusion, however, is open to
criticism. Shareholders who are unidentified or disinterested are
precisely the persons to whom Congress extended the protections
of the Williams Act. Such shareholders are the "pawn[s].

.

.lost

somewhere in the shuffle1 338 who would benefit most from their
corporation's action under section 13(d). Notwithstanding Gateway's reasoning, such an action would further the goals of section
13(d).
Admittedly, the congressional intent not to favor one side or
the other in a takeover attempt might be threatened if an issuer
could pursue an injunction. This danger, however, must be
weighed against the inevitable result which would follow if the
issuing corporation could not pursue an injunction: violations of
the Williams Act would go unremedied. Congress intended the
Williams Act to close a gap in the disclosure provisions of the
securities laws. Without private enforcement by issuing corporations, this gap will remain open. Although neutrality is a real concern, disclosure is more compelling. The concerns may be
balanced effectively, as noted by the Milstein court, if "the district
court carefully scrutinizes self-serving management claims allegedly made in the interest of investor protection."339
V. A

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE WILLIAMS ACT

In July of 1979, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs wrote to the Chairman of the SEC, Harold M. Williams, concerning the enforceability of the Williams Act. 3 t
Recognizing the Supreme Court's hesitance in granting private relief,34 the Committee was "interested in reviewing whatever pro-

posals the SEC ha[d] developed in light of its experience to restore
to aggrieved persons access to the Federal courts in tender offer
situations.

'34 2

The SEC responded in February of 1980 by reom-

337. Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, 495 F. Supp. at 101. Although the
majority of investors do not read the Schedule 13Ds which are filed, the sophisticated investor does read the material and act accordingly. Professor Painter's "trickle down" thethe prevailing market price of a security mirrors 'all the publicly available
ory asserts: "[I]f
information, greater disclosure must lead to greater market efficiency.'" Note, supra note
135, at 673 n.263 (citing W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 396).
338. Senate Hearings,supra note 5, at 178.
339. 453 F.2d at 719-20.
340. Commission Report, supra note 53, at 5.
341. Id. (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)).
342. Id.
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mending "the enactment of a provision dealing withprivate rights
of action for violations of the Williams Act provisions. 3 43 The
SEC cited the Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington344 and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis345 decisions as the impetus
for proposing an express private cause of action under the Williams Act.34 6
The SEC proposed to amend section 14 of the Exchange Act
by adding subsection (i) which would grant standing to sue to all
parties to a takeover attempt. Proposed section 14(i) provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Any person who violates sections 13(d) [and/or the other
provisions of the Williams Act], shall be liable to: [an issuing
corporation or a shareholder of the issuer] . . .; who is aggrieved by such violation, and the person so aggrieved may
bring suit in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover
damages and seek such equitable relief, including divestiture of
securities acquired in violation of the [Williams Act] ... ;provided, however, that no person shall be liable for damages
under this subsection if he proves that he exercised reasonable
care in the circumstances.
In explanation of the proposal, the SEC reiterated its desire to
primarily benefit the shareholders of the issuer.348 Yet, the SEC
recognized:
[R]ealistically, individual shareholders (or even class representatives) cannot always be expected to pursue such claims. The
secondary beneficiaries of the Williams Act--[the issuing corporations]-are often in a better position to enforce the Act's
provisions in the face of transgressions than are shareholders.
Giving them a right of action will help deter violations of these
provisions in the course of battles for corporate control, and
consequently will assist in carrying out the Congressional policies underlying the Williams Act. 4 9
In order to ensure the effective enforcement of section 13(d) disclosure, Congress should be urged to act expeditiously and favora343. Id. at 79 (emphasis by the SEC).
344. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
345. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
346. Commission Report, supra note 53, at 80.

347. Id. at 96-97. Under the proposed section 14(i), in addition to injunctive relief, the
issuing corporation or its shareholders could sue for damages regardless of whether they
purchased or sold stock in reliance on a false filing as required under section 18(a). Proposed section 14(i)(2) requires only that the person show that he or she did not have knowledge of relevant facts which would be considered important in making investment
decisions. Id. at 97-98.
348. Id. at 119.
349. Id. at 119-20.

19811

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(d)

bly upon this proposal. 5 °
VI.

CONCLUSION

Under the present Court's strict statutory construction standard for implication, it appears that an issuing corporation does
not have an implied private remedy under section 13(d). If the
disclosure requirement of section 13(d) is to be effective, however,
the issuer must be able to supplement SEC action. Therefore,

Congress must legislate the proposed express private cause of action for injunctive relief under the Williams Act. An express private remedy would facilitate the effective enforcement of section
13(d) and close the gap in the federal securities laws, thereby
achieving the primary objective of the Williams Act.
EDWARD WINSLOW MOORE

350. The ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1978 Proposed Official Draft), reprintedinW. PAINTER,
supra note 47, would also expressly create a private cause of action for the issuing corporation and its shareholders. Section 1713 of the FED. SEC. CODE provides:
(b) On proof in an action by the issuer of a security that is the subject of a tender
offer (or a proposed tender offer) or whose acquisition requires a filing under
section 605(b) [similar to section 13(d) of the Exchange Act], a holder of such a
security (or of another security whose interests are adversely affected), a person
who has tendered a security pursuant to a tender offer, or a person who has made
or proposes to make a tender offer, that the defendant has violated, is violating, or
is about to violate section 605(b) . . . , a court may (1) enjoin a violation or
further violation, (2) require compliance, (3) enjoin the voting of securities acquired in violation or the consummation of action authorized by their having
been voted, (4) set aside action so consummated, (5) award damages against the
violator for any loss caused by his violation, or (6) grant other appropriate relief
(preliminary or final), including a combination of the types of relief here specified.
Id. at 416.

